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Generating huge quasigroups from small non-linear
bijections via extended Feistel function
Smile Markovski and Aleksandra Mileva
Abstract. Quasigroups of huge order, like 2256, 2512, 21024, that can be effectively con-
structed, have important applications in designing several cryptographic primitives. We
propose an effective method for construction of such huge quasigroups of order r = 2s2
t
for
small fixed values of s and arbitrary values of t; the complexity of computation of the quasi-
group multiplication is O(log(log(r))) = O(t). Besides the computational effectiveness,
these quasigroups can be constructed in such a way to have other desirable cryptographic
properties: do not satisfy the commutative law, the associative law, the idempotent law, to
have no proper subquasigroups, to be non-linear, etc. These quasigroups are constructed by
complete mappings generated by suitable bijections of order 2s via extended Feistel network
functions.
1. Introduction
The cryptographic community started dealing with quasigroups (or Latin squares,
as their combinatorial counterpart) for producing different kinds of crypto-
graphic primitives two decades ago. Authentication schemas have been pro-
posed by J. Dènes and A.D. Keedwell (1992) [4], secret sharing schemes by
J. Cooper et al. (1994) [3], a version of popular DES block cipher by using
Latin squares by G. Carter et al. (1995) [2], different proposals for use in
the design of cryptographic hash functions by several authors [10, 12, 20, 26],
Latin squares in cipher systems (2003) [14], PRNG based on quasigroup string
transformations by S. Markovski and al. (2005) [19], a hardware stream cipher
by D. Gligoroski et al. (2005) [9], a public key cipher by D. Gligoroski, S.
Markovski and S.J. Knapskog (2008) [11], and many others.
A quasigroup is a groupoid (Q, ∗) that satisfies the property each one of
the equations a ∗ x = b and y ∗ a = b to have a unique solution x, respectively
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y. When Q is a finite set, the main body of the Cayley table of the quasi-
group (Q, ∗) represents a Latin square, i.e., a matrix with rows and columns
that are permutations of Q. In cryptographic applications the quasigroups
are usually used in two different ways. If they are of relatively small order
(|Q| = 4, 8, 16, 32), then the designers iteratively apply them many times
(e.g., 80 times in EDON80 [9]). On the other side, for obtaining fast and
secure cryptographic systems with a few iterations, finite quasigroups of huge
order (called huge quasigroups) are needed. Here, by huge order we mean
|Q| = 2n, n = 16, 32, 64, 128, . . . .
Huge quasigroups can not be represented by Cayley tables and one should
define them by using suitable functions. The cryptographic qualities of the
huge quasigroups depend on the functions that are used for their definitions.
By a quasigroup of a good cryptographic quality we mean a finite quasigroup
that is non-commutative, non-associative, non-idempotent, without right or
left units and without a proper subquasigroup. The algebraic degree of the
quasigroup should be as high as possible, at least 2. Also, they should not
satisfy identities of the kinds x ∗ (... ∗ (x︸ ︷︷ ︸
l
∗y)) = y and y = ((y ∗ x) ∗ ...) ∗ x︸ ︷︷ ︸
l
for
some l < 2n, where n is the order of the quasigroup.
Here we use modified Feistel networks [8], that we call extended Feistel
networks, to define huge quasigroups. A Feistel network takes any function
and transforms it into a bijection, so it is commonly used technique for cre-
ating a non-linear cryptographic function [6], [16]. Using a Feistel network
for creating a huge quasigroup is not a novel approach. Kristen [21] presents
several different constructions using one or two Feistel networks and isotopies
of quasigroups. Complete mappings, introduced by Mann [17] (the equiva-
lent concept of orthomorphism was introduced explicitly in [5]), are also useful
for creation of huge quasigroups. In [21] complete mappings with non-affine
functions represented by Cayley tables or with affine functions represented by
binary transformations are used for that aim. The main disadvantages of the
previously mentioned constructions is the lack of efficiency in one case and the
lack of security in other case. Namely, the Cayley table representations need a
lot of memory, and the affine functions have no good cryptographic properties.
In this paper we conjunct these two approaches. In fact, we use extended
Feistel networks as complete mappings to generate huge quasigroups of order
r = 2s2
t
. We only need to store small permutations of order 2s, s = 4, 8, 16.
We show that the quasigroups obtained by our construction satisfy the secu-
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rity properties mentioned above (i.e., they are not: commutative, associative,
idempotent, etc.).
The paper is organized as follows. Quasigroups obtained by complete map-
pings are considered in Section 2, where it is shown that such a quasigroup
has a property that each of its parastrophes is defined by a complete mapping
too. The extended Feistel networks are defined in Section 3, and in Section
4 their algebraic degree is counted. Huge quasigroups defined by extended
Feistel networks are given in Section 5, where their cryptographic properties
are considered too. Conclusion remarks are in Section 6.
2. Complete mappings
Our construction of huge quasigroups is based on quasigroups derived from
groups by using complete mappings. Here we give the needed definitions and
some properties.
Definition 2.1. A complete mapping of a group (G,+) is a bijection θ : G→ G
such that the mapping ϕ : G→ G defined by ϕ(x) = −x+ θ(x) (ϕ = −I + θ,
where I is the identity mapping) is again a bijection of G. The mapping ϕ is
said to be the orthomorphism associated to the complete mapping θ. A group
G is admissible if there is a complete mapping θ : G→ G.
Question about whether or not a group G is admissible is a subject that
has been extensively studied [13, 22, 23]. It is well-known fact that inverse of
the complete mapping is also a complete mapping of Abelian group (G,+) [7].
Sade proposed the following method for creating a quasigroup from an
admissible group [25]:
Proposition 2.1. Let (Q,+) be an admissible group with complete mapping
θ. Define an operation • on Q by:
x • y = θ(x− y) + y (1)
where x, y ∈ Q. Then (Q, •) is a quasigroup. (Then we say that (Q, •) is
derived by θ.) 
In the sequel, we will consider only complete mappings of the Abelian
groups (Zn2 ,⊕n), where ⊕n denotes the operation bitwise XOR of words of
length n bits. The results of Paige [22] implies that the groups (Zn2 ,⊕n) are
admissible. Then the equation (1) get the form:
x • y = θ(x⊕n y)⊕n y. (2)
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Proposition 2.2. If θ is a complete mapping of (Zn2 ,⊕n), then its orthomor-
phism ϕ = I ⊕n θ is a complete mapping of (Zn2 ,⊕n) too, with orthomorphism
θ = I ⊕n ϕ. 
Example 2.1. Let Q = Z22 = {0, 1, 2, 3}, where we use the integer notation
0 ≡ 〈0, 0〉, 1 ≡ 〈0, 1〉, 2 ≡ 〈1, 0〉, 3 ≡ 〈1, 1〉. Define θ : Q → Q by θ(〈x0, x1〉) =
〈x0 ⊕ x1, x0 ⊕ 1〉, where x1, x0 are bits. Table 1 demonstrates that both θ and
I + θ are bijections, and the quasigroup (Q, •) is defined by (2).
x θ(x) ϕ(x) = x⊕2 θ(x)
〈0, 0〉 〈0, 1〉 〈0, 1〉
〈0, 1〉 〈1, 1〉 〈1, 0〉
〈1, 0〉 〈1, 0〉 〈0, 0〉
〈1, 1〉 〈0, 0〉 〈1, 1〉
• 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 0 3
1 3 0 2 1
2 2 1 3 0
3 0 3 1 2
Table 1: The complete mapping θ of the group Z22 and the derived quasigroup.
Given a quasigroup (Q, f), five new operations f−1,−1f,−1(f−1), (−1f)−1
and f∗ on the set Q can be derived by as follows.
−1f(x, y) = z ←→ f(z, y) = x,
f−1(x, y) = z ←→ f(x, z) = y,
−1(f−1)(x, y) = z ←→ f−1(z, y) = x ←→ f(z, x) = y,
(−1f)−1(x, y) = z ←→ (−1f)(x, z) = y ←→ f(y, z) = x,
f∗(x, y) = z ←→ (−1f)−1(x, y) = yz ←→ f(y, x) = z.
The set Par(f) = {f, f−1,−1f,−1(f−1), (−1f)−1, f∗} is said to be the set
of parastrophes of f . |Par(f)| 6 6, i.e., some of parastrophes may coincides
between themselves. For each g ∈ Par(f), (Q, g) is a quasigroup too and
Par(f) = Par(g) (see [1], [4]). The parastrophes of a quasigroup determine
some identities that can be used for cryptographic encoding and decoding
functions to be defined. For example, by using the identities f−1(x, f(x, z)) = z
and f(x, f−1(x, y)) = y, f and f−1 can be taken as encoding and decoding
functions.
The next theorem shows that if a quasigroup (Zn2 , f) is derived by a com-
plete mapping, then all of its parastrophes can be derived by complete map-
pings too. This fact can be especially useful for encoding and decoding pur-
poses.
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Theorem 2.1. Let θ : Zn2 → Zn2 be a complete mapping of the group (Zn2 ,⊕n)
and let (Zn2 , f) be the quasigroup derived by f(x, y) = θ(x⊕n y)⊕n y. Then the
following statements are true.
a) (Q,−1f) is derived by the complete mapping δ = θ−1.
b) (Q, f−1) is derived by the complete mapping λ = (I ⊕n θ−1)−1.
c) (Q, (−1(f−1))) is derived by the complete mapping ρ = I ⊕n θ−1.
d) (Q, (−1f)−1) is derived by the complete mapping τ = (I ⊕n θ)−1.
e) (Q, f∗) is derived by the complete mapping ϕ = I ⊕n θ.
Proof. a) −1f(x, y) = z ←→ f(z, y) = x←→ θ(z ⊕n y)⊕n y = x←→
z ⊕n y = θ−1(x⊕n y)←→ z = θ−1(x⊕n y)⊕n y, and that implies
−1f(x, y) = δ(x⊕n y)⊕n y.
b) f−1(x, y) = z ←→ f(x, z) = y ←→ θ(x⊕n z)⊕n z = y
←→ x⊕n z = θ−1(y ⊕n z) ←→ x = θ−1(y ⊕n z)⊕n z ⊕n y ⊕n y
←→ x⊕n y = θ−1(y ⊕n z)⊕n y ⊕n z ←→ x⊕n y = (I ⊕ θ−1)(y ⊕n z)
←→ (I ⊕n θ−1)−1(x⊕n y) = y ⊕n z ←→ (I ⊕n θ−1)−1(x⊕n y)⊕n y = z,
and that implies f−1(x, y) = λ(x⊕n y)⊕n y.
c) (−1(f−1))(x, y) = z ←→ f−1(z, y) = x←→ f(z, x) = y
←→ θ(z ⊕n x)⊕n x = y ←→ z ⊕n x = θ−1(x⊕n y)
←→ z = θ−1(x⊕n y)⊕n x⊕n y ⊕n y ←→ z = (I ⊕n θ−1)(x⊕n y)⊕n y,
and that implies (−1(f−1))(x, y) = ρ(x⊕n y)⊕n y.
d) (−1f)−1(x, y) = z ←→−1 f(x, z) = y ←→ f(y, z) = x
←→ θ(y ⊕n z)⊕n z = x←→ z ⊕n y ⊕n θ(z ⊕n y) = x⊕n y
←→ (I ⊕n θ)(z ⊕n y) = x⊕n y ←→ z ⊕n y = (I ⊕n θ)−1(x⊕n y)←→
z = (I ⊕n θ)−1(x⊕n y)⊕n y, and that implies (−1f)−1(x, y) = τ(x⊕n y)⊕n y.
e) f∗(x, y) = z ←→ f(y, x) = z ←→ θ(y ⊕n x)⊕n x = z ←→
θ(x⊕n y)⊕n x⊕n y⊕n y = z ←→ (I ⊕n θ)(x⊕n y)⊕n y = z, and that implies
f∗(x, y) = ϕ(x⊕n y)⊕n y.
3. Extended Feistel networks
Generally, a group with affine complete mapping do not produces a quasigroup
that satisfies the cryptography needs. Non-affine complete mappings are more
promising. It is very easy to create a table-driven non-affine complete mapping
as long as we don't care about the order of the quasigroup. Considering huge
quasigroups, practically it is not possible to store table-driven bijections. It is
much more difficult to create a non-affine bijection that is not table-driven and,
96 S. Markovski and A. Mileva
additionally, that is a complete mapping. By using extended Feistel network,
we create a huge non-affine complete mapping from a small table-driven non-
affine bijection.
Definition 3.1. Let (G,+) be an Abelian group, let f : G→ G be a mapping
and let a, b, c ∈ G be constants. The extended Feistel network (shortly ExtFN),
Fa,b,c : G2 → G2 created by f is defined for every l, r ∈ G by
Fa,b,c(l, r) = (r + a, l + b+ f(r + c)).
The extended Feistel network Fa,b,c is a bijection with inverse
F−1a,b,c(l, r) = (r − b− f(l + c− a), l − a).
A Feistel network can be obtained from an ExtFN if we take constants a =
b = c = 0.
One of the main results of the paper, that we will use frequently, is the
following.
Theorem 3.1. Let (G,+) be an arbitrary Abelian group and a, b, c ∈ G. If
Fa,b,c : G2→ G2 is an extended Feistel network created by a bijection f :G→ G,
then Fa,b,c is a complete mapping of the group (G2,+).
Proof. Let ϕ = −I + Fa,b,c, i.e.,
ϕ(l, r) = −(l, r) + F (l, r) = (−l + r + a,−r + l + b+ f(r + c))
for every l, r ∈ G. Define the function Ω : G2 → G2 by
Ω(l, r) = (f−1(l + r − a− b)− l + a− c, f−1(l + r − a− b)− c).
We have Ω ◦ ϕ = ϕ ◦ Ω = I, i.e., ϕ and Ω = ϕ−1 are bijections.
In the sequel we will consider only ExtFN of the Abelian groups (Zn2 ,⊕n).
Definition 3.2. Let (G,+) be a group and let f : G→ G be a mapping. f is
an affine mapping if f(x + y) = f(x) + f(y) − f(0) for each x, y ∈ G, where
0 ∈ G is the identity element. A linear mapping is an affine mapping f with
f(0) = 0.
Proposition 3.1. Let a, b, c ∈ Zk2 and let Fa,b,c : Z2k2 → Z2k2 be an extended
Feistel network created by a mapping f : Zk2 → Zk2. Then Fa,b,c is affine iff f
is affine.
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Proof. Let l1, l2, r1, r2 ∈ Zk2 and let f be affine. Then, since f(r1⊕k r2⊕k c) =
f(r1 ⊕k c)⊕k f(r2 ⊕k c)⊕k f(c), we have that Fa,b,c is affine as well:
Fa,b,c((l1, r1)⊕2k (l2, r2))
= ((r1 ⊕k r2 ⊕k a), (l1 ⊕k l2 ⊕k b⊕k f(r1 ⊕k r2 ⊕k c)))
= [(r1⊕k a), (l1⊕k b⊕k f(r1⊕k c))]⊕2k [(r2⊕k a), (l2⊕k b⊕k f(r2⊕k c))]⊕2k
[(0⊕k a), (0⊕k b⊕k f(0⊕k c))]
= Fa,b,c(l1, r1)⊕2k Fa,b,c(l2, r2)⊕2k Fa,b,c(0, 0),
Let now Fa,b,c be an affine function. Then we have
Fa,b,c((l1, r1)⊕2k (l2, r2)) = Fa,b,c(l1, r1)⊕2k Fa,b,c(l2, r2)⊕2k Fa,b,c(0, 0)
and that implies
f(r1 ⊕k r2 ⊕k c) = f(r1)⊕k f(r2)⊕k f(c)
for each r1, r2 ∈ Zk2. We infer from the last equality that f is affine too:
f(r1 ⊕k r2) = f(r1 ⊕k (r2 ⊕k c)⊕k c) = f(r1)⊕k f(r2 ⊕k c)⊕k f(c) =
f(r1) ⊕k f(0 ⊕k r2 ⊕k c) ⊕k f(c) = f(r1) ⊕k f(0) ⊕k f(r2) ⊕k f(c) ⊕k f(c) =
f(r1)⊕k f(r2)⊕k f(0).
So, if a non-affine ExtFN Fa,b,c created by f is needed as a complete map-
ping, it is enough to take f to be a non-affine bijection.
Proposition 3.2. Let f, g : Zk2 → Zk2 be bijections, a, b, c, a′, b′, c′ ∈ Zk2 and
let Fa,b,c, Fa′,b′,c′ : Z2k2 → Z2k2 be extended Feistel networks created by f and g
respectively. Then the composite function Fa,b,c ◦Fa′,b′,c′ is a complete mapping
on Z2k2 too.
Proof. Let ϕ = I ⊕2k Fa,b,c ◦ Fa′,b′,c′ . Then, for every l, r ∈ Zk2, we have
ϕ(l, r) = ((g(r ⊕k c′)⊕k a⊕k b′), (a′ ⊕k b⊕k f(l ⊕k b′ ⊕k g(r ⊕k c′)⊕k c))).
Define the function Ω : Z2k2 → Z2k2 by
Ω(l, r) = ((f−1(r ⊕k a′ ⊕k b)⊕k l ⊕k a⊕k c), (g−1(l ⊕k a⊕k b′)⊕k c′)).
It can be checked that Ω◦ϕ = ϕ◦Ω = I, i.e., ϕ and Ω = ϕ−1 are bijections.
Corollary 3.1. If Fa,b,c is an extended Feistel network created by bijection f ,
then F 2a,b,c is a complete mapping of (Z2k2 ,⊕2k) too. 
In general, if θ is a complete mapping on a group G, θ2 may not be a
complete mapping on G, as Example 3.1 shows.
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Example 3.1. We have in Table 2 a complete mapping θ(x) on (Z42,⊕4) (given
in integer representation) such that θ2(x) is not a complete mapping, as it is
shown in Table 3.
x 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
θ(x) 12 6 3 14 2 13 5 9 8 11 15 1 7 4 10 0
x⊕4 θ(x) 12 7 1 13 6 8 3 14 0 2 5 10 11 9 4 15
Table 2: Integer representation of a complete mapping θ(x).
x 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
θ2(x) 7 5 14 10 3 4 13 11 8 1 0 6 9 2 15 12
x⊕4 θ2(x) 7 4 12 9 7 1 11 12 0 8 10 13 5 15 1 3
Table 3: Integer representation of a non-complete mapping θ2(x).
x 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
f(x) 3 2 1 0
F (x) 3 6 9 12 2 7 8 13 1 4 11 14 0 5 10 15
x⊕4 F (x) 3 7 11 15 6 2 14 10 9 13 1 5 12 8 4 0
Table 4: Integer representation of an extended Feistel network F (x).
Example 3.2. In Table 4 we have an example of an ExtFN F = F0,0,0 that is
a complete mapping created by a bijection f such that F 3 is not a complete
mapping. Namely, F 3 is the identical mapping, so I ⊕4 F 3 = I ⊕4 I is the
constant zero mapping, that maps each x ∈ Z42 into 0.
4. The algebraic degree of an ExtFN
A vector valued Boolean function (v.v.b.f.) is a mapping B : Z2s → Z2t, where
s and t > 1 are positive integers; we have a Boolean function for t = 1. Each
v.v.b.f. B can be represented by t Boolean functions bi : Z2s → Z2 as follows:
B(x1, . . . , xs) = (b1(x1, . . . , xs), b2(x1, . . . xs), . . . , bt(x1, . . . , xs)),
where
b1(x1, . . . , xs) = y1, . . . , bt(x1, . . . , xs) = yt ←→ B(x1, . . . , xs) = (y1, . . . , yt).
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Each Boolean function bi can be represented in Algebraic Normal Form as







where αI ∈ Z2, the sum is for the Boolean function XOR and the product is for
the Boolean function conjunction. The right-hand side of (3) can be interpreted
as a polynomial in the field (Z2,+, ·) and the degree of bi is taken to be the
degree of the polynomial. The algebraic degree of a v.v.b.f. B is defined as
the maximum of the degrees of its component polynomials (b1, b2, . . . , bs):
deg(B) = max{deg(bi) | i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , s}}.
Theorem 4.1. Let the bijection f : Zk2 → Zk2 be of algebraic degree deg(f) > 1
and let Fa,b,c : Z2k2 → Z2k2 be an extended Feistel network created by f . Then
deg(Fa,b,c) = deg(f).
Proof. Let (a1, . . . , ak), (b1, . . . , bk) and (c1, . . . , ck) be the binary representa-
tions of the constants a, b, c ∈ Zk2. The mappings f : Zk2 → Zk2 and Fa,b,c :
Z2k2 → Z2k2 are v.v.b.f. and so there are Boolean polynomials q1, q2, . . . , qk and
p1, p2, . . . , p2k such that
f(x1, . . . , xk) = (q1(x1, . . . , xk), q2(x1, . . . , xk), . . . , qk(x1, . . . , xk)),
Fa,b,c(x1, . . . , x2k) = (p1(x1, . . . , x2k), p2(x1, . . . , x2k), . . . , p2k(x1, . . . , x2k)).
Let deg(f) = max{deg(qi) | i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}} > 1. Then there is a t ∈
{1, 2, . . . , k} such that deg(f) = deg(qt).
We have Fa,b,c(x1, . . . , x2k) = (xk+1 ⊕ a1, . . . , x2k ⊕ ak, x1 ⊕ b1 ⊕ q1(xk+1 ⊕
c1, . . . , x2k ⊕ ck), . . . , xk ⊕ bk ⊕ qk(xk+1 ⊕ c1, . . . , x2k ⊕ ck)). This implies that
pi(x1, . . . , x2k) = xi+k ⊕ ai and pi+k(x1, . . . , x2k) = xi ⊕ bi ⊕ qi(xk+1 ⊕
c1, . . . , x2k ⊕ ck) for each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}. Then, for each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k},
deg(pi) = 1 and
deg(pi+k) =
{
0, ∀ i (qi(xk+1 ⊕ c1, . . . , x2k ⊕ ck) = xi ⊕ bi)
deg(qi), otherwise.
(4)
So, deg(Fa,b,c) = deg(f).
Example 4.1. A bijection f : Z42 → Z42 of deg(f) = 3 is given in Table 5. The
representation of f as v.v.b.f. is f(x1, x2, x3, x4) = (q1, q2, q3, q4), where
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q1(x1, x2, x3, x4) = x1 + x3 + x4 + x1x3 + x1x4 + x2x3 + x1x2x4 + x2x3x4,
q2(x1, x2, x3, x4) = x2 + x3 + x4 + x1x4 + x3x4 + x1x2x3,
q3(x1, x2, x3, x4) = x1 + x3 + x1x4 + x1x2x3,
q4(x1, x2, x3, x4) = 1+x1+x2+x4+x1x2+x1x3+x1x4+x2x3+x1x2x3+x1x2x4.
x 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
f(x) 1 12 15 6 4 9 3 2 10 8 13 11 14 5 7 0
Table 5: A bijection f of deg(f) = 3.
The Theorem 4.1 implies that we can make non-affine complete mapping
Fa,b,c of different non-linearity. Namely, it is enough to choose a non-affine
bijection f of desired degree. An effective construction of a bijection f of
predefined higher degree is an open problem. Note that the maximum degree
of a mapping f : Zk2 → Zk2 is less or equal than k.
The complete mapping Fa,b,c has the property that the first k polynomials
are of degree 1. On the other side, the complete mapping F 2a,b,c is with better
performances, since F 2a,b,c(x1, . . . , x2k) = (A,B), where
A=(x1⊕b1⊕q1(xk+1⊕c1, . . . , x2k⊕ck), . . . , xk⊕bk⊕qk(xk+1⊕c1, . . . , x2k⊕ck)),
B = (xk+1 ⊕ a1 ⊕ q1(x1 ⊕ b1 ⊕ q1(xk+1 ⊕ c1, . . . , x2k ⊕ ck), . . . , xk ⊕ bk ⊕
qk(xk+1⊕ c1, . . . , x2k⊕ ck)), . . . , x2k⊕ak⊕ qk(x1⊕ b1⊕ q1(xk+1⊕ c1, . . . , x2k⊕
ck), . . . , xk ⊕ bk ⊕ qk(xk+1 ⊕ c1, . . . , x2k ⊕ ck)).
5. Huge quasigroups obtained by a chain of ExtFN
Recall that an ExtFN Fa,b,c (a, b, c ∈ Z2s) created by a bijection f : Z2s →




= Fa,b,c and let F (n)a(n),b(n),c(n) , n > 1, be defined. Then, for
some a(n+1), b(n+1), c(n+1) ∈ Z2s2n+1 , define F (n+1)a(n+1),b(n+1),c(n+1) to be the ExtFN
created by the bijection F
(n)
a(n),b(n),c(n)




mapping of the group Z2s2
n
for each n > 1, hence we have defined inductively a
chain of complete mappings {F (n)
a(n),b(n),c(n)
| n = 1, 2, 3, . . . } in the corresponding





for each n > 1.
In applications one needs effectively constructed quasigroups of order 2256,
2512, 21024, . . . . A huge quasigroup of order 22
k
can now be designed as follows.
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Take a suitable non-affine bijection of desired algebraic degree f : Z22
t → Z22t ,
where t < k is a small positive integer (t = 2, 3, 4). Choose suitable constants
a(i), b(i), c(i) ∈ Z22t+i , 1 6 i 6 k − t, and construct iteratively the complete
mapping F = F (k−t)
a(k−t),b(k−t),c(k−t) : Z2
2k → Z22k . Define a quasigroup operation
• on the set Z22k by (1), i.e., x • y = F (x⊕ y)⊕ y, for every x, y ∈ Z22k .
Note that we need only k − t iterations for getting F and a small amount
of memory for storing the bijection f . Hence, the complexity of our algorithm
for construction of quasigroups of order n = 22
k
is O(log(log n)).
Example 5.1. As starting bijection we can use the bijection f : Z42 → Z42
from Example 4.1. So, t = 2. We choose constants (a(i), b(i), c(i)) = (i, 0, 0) ∈
Z22
t+i
, i = 1, 2, . . . , 7. Now we can construct the following complete mappings,
where li, ri ∈ Zi2, i = 4, 8, 16, . . . :
F
(1)
1,0,0 : Z82 → Z82 as F (1)1,0,0(l4, r4) = ((r4 ⊕4 1), (l4 ⊕4 f(r4))),
F
(2)
2,0,0 : Z162 → Z162 as F (2)2,0,0(l8, r8) = ((r8 ⊕8 2), (l8 ⊕8 F (1)1,0,0(r8))),
F
(3)
3,0,0 : Z322 → Z322 as F (3)3,0,0(l16, r16) = ((r16 ⊕16 3), (l16 ⊕16 F (2)2,0,0(r16))),
F
(4)
4,0,0 : Z642 → Z642 as F (4)4,0,0(l32, r32) = ((r32 ⊕32 4), (l32 ⊕32 F (3)3,0,0(r32))),
F
(5)
5,0,0 : Z1282 → Z1282 as F (5)5,0,0(l64, r64) = ((r64 ⊕64 5), (l64 ⊕64 F (4)4,0,0(r64))),
F
(6)
6,0,0 : Z2562 → Z2562 as F (6)6,0,0(l128, r128)=((r128⊕1286),(l128⊕128F (5)5,0,0(r128))),
F
(7)
7,0,0 :Z5122 →Z5122 as F (7)7,0,0(l256, r256)=((r256⊕2567), (l256⊕256F (6)6,0,0(r256))).
We need only 7 = 9− 2 iterations for getting F (7)7,0,0 : Z5122 → Z5122 .
Further on in this section we consider the algebraic properties of the quasi-
groups obtained by the above algorithm. For that aim we take a somewhat
simplified situation when f : Zk2 → Zk2 is a bijection and Fa,b,c : Z2k2 → Z2k2
is an ExtFN created by f . We denote by (Q, •) the quasigroup on the set
Q = Z2k2 derived by the complete mapping Fa,b,c.
Proposition 5.1. The quasigroup (Q, •) is non-idempotent iff f(c) 6= b or
a 6= 0.
Proof. Let (Q, •) be idempotent. Then, for all x ∈ Q we have
x • x = x←→ Fa,b,c(x⊕2k x)⊕2k x = x←→ Fa,b,c(0, 0) = (0, 0)
←→ Fa,b,c(a, b⊕k f(c)) = (0, 0)←→ a = 0 ∧ f(c) = b.
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Proposition 5.2. The quasigroup (Q, •) does have neither left nor right unit.
Proof. Let e be the right unit of (Q, •). Then, for all x ∈ Q, we have
x • e = x −→ Fa,b,c(x⊕2k e)⊕2k e = x −→ Fa,b,c(x⊕2k e) = x⊕2k e.
This means that Fa,b,c = I is the identity mapping. We have now, for every
l, r ∈ Q, that (r ⊕k a, l ⊕k b ⊕k f(r ⊕k c)) = (l, r) and this implies that
f(r⊕k c) = a⊕k b for each r. The last equality contradicts the bijectivity of f .
Let e be the left unit of (Q, •). Then, for all x ∈ Q, we have
e • x = x −→ Fa,b,c(e⊕2k x)⊕2k x = x −→ Fa,b,c(e⊕2k x) = 0.
This contradicts the fact that Fa,b,c is a bijection.
Proposition 5.3. The equality
(x • y) • (y • x) = x (5)
is an identity in (Q, •).
Proof. (x • y) • (y • x) = Fa,b,c((x • y)⊕n (y • x))⊕n (y • x)) =
Fa,b,c(Fa,b,c(x⊕n y)⊕n y⊕n Fa,b,c(y⊕n x)⊕n x)⊕n Fa,b,c(y⊕n x)⊕n x = x.
The quasigroups that satisfy the identity (5) are known as Schroeder quasi-
groups (see [15]).
Corollary 5.1. The quasigroup (Q, •) is anti-commutative, i.e., no different
elements of Q commutes.
Proof. Let x, y ∈ Q and let x•y = y•x. By (5), we have x = (x•y)•(y•x) =
(y • x) • (x • y) = y.
Lemma 5.1. Let ϕ = I ⊕2k Fa,b,c. Then ϕ ◦ Fa,b,c = Fa,b,c ◦ ϕ iff a = 0 and
f(r⊕k c)⊕k f(l⊕k b⊕k c⊕k f(r⊕k c)) = b⊕k f(l⊕k r⊕k b⊕k c⊕k f(r⊕k c))
for each l, r ∈ Q.
Proof. Let l, r ∈ Q. Then
ϕ(l, r) = ((l ⊕k r ⊕k a), (l ⊕k r ⊕k b⊕k f(r ⊕k c))),
(ϕ ◦ Fa,b,c)(l, r) = ((r ⊕k l ⊕k b⊕k f(r ⊕k c)), (r ⊕k a⊕k l ⊕k f(r ⊕k c)⊕k
f(l ⊕k b⊕k f(r ⊕k c)⊕k c))),
(Fa,b,c ◦ ϕ)(l, r) = ((l ⊕k r ⊕k b⊕k f(r ⊕k c)⊕k a), (l ⊕k r ⊕k a⊕k b⊕k
f(l ⊕k r ⊕k b⊕k f(r ⊕k c)⊕k c))).
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Hence, we have:
(ϕ ◦ Fa,b,c)(l, r) = (Fa,b,c ◦ ϕ)(l, r) ←→ a = 0 ∧ f(r ⊕k c) ⊕k f(l ⊕k b ⊕k
c⊕k f(r ⊕k c)) = b⊕k f(l ⊕k r ⊕k b⊕k c⊕k f(r ⊕k c)).
Lemma 5.2. For the quasigroup (Q, •) we have
x • (y • x) = (x • y) • x←→ (ϕ ◦ Fa,b,c)(x⊕2k y) = (Fa,b,c ◦ ϕ)(x⊕2k y)
for any x, y ∈ Q, x 6= y, where ϕ = I ⊕2k Fa,b,c.
Proof. x • (y • x) = (x • y) • x ←→ Fa,b,c(x ⊕2k Fa,b,c(y ⊕2k x) ⊕2k x) ⊕2k
Fa,b,c(y ⊕2k x)⊕2k x = Fa,b,c(Fa,b,c(x⊕2k y)⊕2k y ⊕2k x)⊕2k x←→
Fa,b,c(Fa,b,c(y ⊕2k x)) ⊕2k Fa,b,c(y ⊕2k x) = Fa,b,c(Fa,b,c(x ⊕2k y) ⊕2k x ⊕2k y)
←→ ϕ(Fa,b,c(x⊕2k y)) = Fa,b,c(ϕ(x⊕2k y)).
An immediate consequence of Lemma 5.1 and Lemma 5.2 is that
x • (x • x) = (x • x) • x←→ a = 0 ∧ f(c) = b.
Now we have the following sufficient conditions for non-associativity of the
quasigroup (Q, •).
Proposition 5.4. If a 6= 0, or f(c) 6= b, or ϕ ◦ Fa,b,c(x) 6= Fa,b,c ◦ ϕ(x) for
some x 6= 0 ∈ Q, then the quasigroup (Q, •) is non-associative. 
It can be checked that the quasigroup (Q, •) is associative iff the following
equalities are identities in (Zk2,⊕k), where t, xl, xr, yl, yr, zl, zr are variables:
t = xl ⊕k xr ⊕k zl ⊕k zr ⊕k f(yr ⊕k zr ⊕k c),
t = a⊕k f(xr ⊕k yr ⊕k c),
t = b⊕k f(xl ⊕k yl ⊕k yr ⊕k zr ⊕k a⊕k b⊕k c⊕k t)⊕k
⊕k f(xl ⊕k yl ⊕k b⊕k c⊕k t).
 (6)
Namely, we can represent x, y, z ∈ Q by x = (xl, xr), y = (yl, yr), z = (zl, zr),
where xl, xr, yl, yr, zl, zr ∈ Zk2, and then (x • y) • z = x • (y • z) iff (6) holds
true. This shows that the quasigroup (Q, •) is highly non-associative, since a
bijection f can hardly satisfies the equations (6) for given elements x, y, z ∈ Q.
Note that if θ is a complete mapping of a group (Zn2 ,⊕n), we have
y • x = θ(y ⊕n x)⊕n x
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(y • x) • x = θ(θ(y ⊕n x)⊕n x⊕n x)⊕n x = θ2(y ⊕n x)⊕n x
and, by induction, ((y • x) • . . . ) • x︸ ︷︷ ︸
l
= θl(y ⊕n x)⊕n x.
We have also
x • y = θ(x⊕n y)⊕n y ⊕n x⊕n x = ϕ(x⊕n y)⊕n x,
x • (x • y) = θ(x⊕n ϕ(x⊕n y)⊕n x)⊕n ϕ(x⊕n y)⊕n x = ϕ2(x⊕n y)⊕n x
and, by induction, x • (· · · • (x︸ ︷︷ ︸
l
•y)) = ϕl(x⊕n y)⊕n x.
Proposition 5.5.
a) The identity y = ((y • x) • . . . ) • x︸ ︷︷ ︸
l
holds true in (Q, •) iff F la,b,c = I.
b) The identity x • (· · · • (x︸ ︷︷ ︸
l
•y)) = y holds true in (Q, •) iff ϕl = I,
where ϕ = I ⊕2k Fa,b,c. 
Regarding the subquasigroups of the quasigroup (Q, •), we notice the fol-
lowing property, where < A > denotes the subquasigroup generated by the
subset A of Q.
Proposition 5.6. < 0 >=< {F ia,b,c(0) | i = 1, 2, . . . } > .
Proof. 0•0 = Fa,b,c(0), Fa,b,c(0)•0 = F 2a,b,c(0), F 2a,b,c(0)•0 = F 3a,b,c(0), . . . .
6. Conclusions
In this paper we have defined a generalization of a Feistel network so called ex-
tended Feistel network, and then we conjuncted two very familiar approaches
of Feistel networks and complete mappings in one novel way for creating quasi-
groups of huge order 2s2
t
. The starting function f , needed a Feistel network to
be defined, is of small order 2s and it can be chosen in such a way the created
quasigroup to be non-idempotent, non-commutative, non-associative, without
left or right unit, nonlinear,... Although of huge order, the multiplication in
the created quasigroup is highly effective, its complexity is O(t).
The quasigroups of huge orders defined in this paper are suitable for ap-
plications in cryptography. The fact that the constructed extended Feistel
networks are complete mappings θ, such that the mappings θ−1 and I⊕k θ are
also complete, can be used parastrophes to be defined in a suitable way. So,
these quasigroups can be used for encoding and decoding purposes.
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